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INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are presented with a search warrant. The warrant
authorizes law enforcement officials to search your home and seize
various items, including electronic devices. The search is conducted and
among the seized items is an iPhone. Instead of confiscating the phone
and ending the search, the officers direct you to place your thumb on the
Touch ID sensor or Home button. You hesitate, questioning whether this
is legal.

* Casey Coffey graduated University of Florida Levin College of Law in 2020. She was
a member of the Journal of Law and Public Policy and wrote this Note during her second year of
law school. This Note was picked from the student submissions for publication. Ier topic was
inspired by Judge Dave Lee Brannon, who Casey interned for during the summer of 2018. She
would like to give a special thank you to Judge Brannon for his mentorship and support.
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Requests to authorize law enforcement to compel an individual to
produce biometrics began appearing in warrant requests in 2016. Since
then, courts have wrestled with the legality of these requests and
ultimately split on whether compelling biometrics violates constitutional
rights. This Note analyzes whether law enforcement officials or the
government can compel an individual to produce their fingerprints and
other biometrics for the purpose of unlocking a lawfully seized electronic
device.
Biometrics or biometric recognition is defined as the automated
recognition of an individual based on their unique physical
characteristics, such as fingerprints.1 Biometrics covers a broad range of
technologies including facial recognition, fingerprint recognition and
voice identification. 2 The widespread use of biometric recognition in cell
phones coupled with the vast storage capabilities of these devices makes
this issue one of great significance. If the government can force an
individual to unlock his or her device, then it can gain access to all of the
data that is stored on the device. In theory, this would allow law
enforcement to filter through text messages, photographs, and more. Not
only does this raise privacy concerns, but it also raises the question of
whether this infringes upon an individual's privilege against selfincrimination.
This Note will first explain the rise of biometric recognition
technology in cell phones and the role that modern cell phones play in
everyday life. Second, this Note will analyze the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment concerns raised by these warrant requests, focusing on the
Fifth Amendment because courts have turned on the characterization of
biometrics as testimonial or nontestimonial. Third, this Note will consider
the decisions of the courts that have addressed this issue and will
highlight where the courts are diverging. Last, this Note will set forth a
potential solution as to whether the government can compel an individual
to produce their biometrics in order to unlock a lawfully seized device.
I. THE INCREASED USE OF BIOMETRICS IN CELL PHONES

From the release of the first smartphone in the 1990s, a clunky mobile
device with a battery life of an hour, manufacturers have continuously
worked to improve cellular devices, often by incorporating the latest

1. Biometrics, HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/biometrics [https://perma.cc/HQ8TVB8X] (May 9, 2019); What is Biometrics?, BIOMETRICS INST., https://www.biometricsinstitute
.org/what-is-biometrics/ [https://perma.cc/4HEV-74PL] [hereinafter What is Biometrics?].
2. Types of Biometrics, BIOMETRICS INST., https://www.biometricsinstitute.org/what-isbiometrics/types-of-biometrics/ [https://perma.cc/Q6WY-HXJB]; What is Biometrics?, supra
note 1.
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technology. 3 In 2013, Apple introduced the first major smartphone to
utilize biometrics, the iPhone 5s.4 The iPhone 5s features a fingerprint
sensor named Touch ID.5 Touch ID allows users to register a fingerprint
that they can then use to unlock the device. 6 In most circumstances, this
allows users to secure their cell phones without requiring a passcode.
With Touch ID, you are able to unlock your device with just a touch.
Other cell phone manufacturers, such as Samsung, followed suit and
incorporated biometric recognition into their products. 7
Less than four years after the release of Touch ID, Apple revealed the
iPhone X. The iPhone X contained the latest of biometric technology,
Face ID.8 Face ID involves the use of facial recognition software. 9 Face
ID's advanced technology maps the geometry of an individual's face and
then allows the individual to unlock the device with a glance at the front
camera. 10 Face ID is ble to register when a user wants to unlock their
device and adapts to changes in appearance. 1
Apple claims that Touch ID and Face ID utilize "some of [Apple's]
most sophisticated technologies" to ensure that customers' devices are
protected from the security risks that accompany this technology, such as
false matches and fraud.1 2 One protective measure for users utilizing
Touch ID or Face ID is that the phone is set up with a passcode.1 3 The
passcode must be entered in order to unlock the device under certain
circumstances such as when the device hasn't been unlocked for more
than 48 hours or when the device restarts.1 4 It is also required when there
3. Doug Aamoth, First Smartphone Turns 20: Fun Facts About Simon, TIME (Aug. 18,
2014), http://time.com/3137005/first-smartphone-ibm-simon/ [https://perma.cc/ZGJ2-LQVC]
("A tip of the hat to Simon, long referenced as the first smartphone. It went on sale to the public

on August 16, 1994.").
4. Fionna Agomuoh, Password-freesmartphones are no longer the stuff ofscience fiction
- they're everywhere, Bus. INS[DER (Dec. 27, 2017, 3:28 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
smartphone-biometrics-are-no-longer-the-stuff-of-science-fiction-2017-12
[https://perma.cc/7Y

JE-B8RG].
5. Id.
6. Use Touch ID on iPhone and iPad, APPLE (Apr. 24, 2019), https:Hsupport.apple
.com/en-us/HT201371 [https://perma.cc/6GKJ-MGKR].
7. Agomuoh, supra note 4.
8. Brian Roemmele, How Does Apple's New Face ID Technology Work?, FoRBES (Sept.
13, 2017, 12:47 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2017/09/13/how-does-apples-newface-id-technology-work/#1c4e636f2b7f [https://perma cc/8PWN-MMQG].

9. Id.
10. Face

ID Security Guide,

APPLE,

docs/site/FacelDSecurityGuide.pdf

2 (Nov. 2017), https://www.apple.com/tr/business/

[https://perma.cc/V86R-4N3F]

[hereinafter

Face ID

Security Guide].
11. Id.

12. About

Touch ID Advanced Security Technology,

APPLE

https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587 [https://perma.cc/GGQ3-WUP2].
13. Face ID Security Guide, supra note 10.

14. Id.

(Sept.

11,

2017),
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are multiple failed attempts to unlock the device with the fingerprint or
facial recognition software.' 5
II. CELL PHONE USAGE & CELL PHONE STORAGE

Cell phones have become an integral part of daily life. According to a
Pew Research Center study, 97% of Americans own a cell phone of some
kind, with 85% owning a smartphone.1 6 This is a dramatic increase from
7
a 2011 study that found only 35% of U.S. adults owned a smartphone.1
Further studies reported 83% of Americans use their mobile device to go
online. 8 Along with cell phone ownership, cell phone storage increased
dramatically. Now, "[t]he sum of an individual's private life" can be
reconstructed through the contents of a cell phone.19
In the 2014 landmark decision of Riley v. California,2 0 the Supreme
21
Court addressed the unique issues that cell phones pose. Riley involved
the consolidation of two appeals where each defendant was advocating
that the warrantless search of their cell phone, which was seized incident
to arrest, was unconstitutional. 22 The Court noted that "[t]hese cases
require us to decide how the search incident to arrest doctrine applies to
modern cell phones, which are now such a pervasive and insistent part of
daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were
an important part of human anatomy." 23
After noting the pervasive presence of cell phones, the Court
identified that the immense storage capacity of modern cell phones raises
much larger privacy concerns than those that are raised in the search of a
wallet or a purse. 2 4 Unlike a wallet or a purse, a cell phone can contain a
record of almost every aspect of an individual's life in pictures, text
25
messages, mobile applications, and other stored data. To determine
"whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement,"
the court weighed "the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an
15. Id.
16. Mobile Phone Ownership Over Time, PEW RESEARCH. CTR. (last updated Apr. 7, 2021),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/X5UF-BK69].
17. Andrew Perrin, 10 Facts About Smartphones as the iPhone Turns 10, PEW RESEARCH
28
/10-facts-aboutCTR. (June 28, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/
smartphones/ [https://perma.cc/UH5G-24W6].
18. Andrew Perrin & Jingling Jiang, About a Quarter of U.S. Adults Say That They Are
'Almost Constantly' Online, PEw RESEARCH CTR. (Mar. 14, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2018/03/14/about-a-quarter-of-americans-report-going-online-almost-constantly/

[https://perma.cc/L346-M5YE].
19. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014).
20. 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
21. Id. at 385.
22. Id. at 379-81 (citing United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2009)).
23. Id. at 385.
24. Id. at 393-95.
25. Id. at 393.
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individual's privacy and . . . the degree to which [the search] is needed
for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." 2 6 The Court
acknowledged that requiring a warrant prior to a search may delay law
enforcement's ability to combat crime, but ultimately found that the
privacy costs outweighed the competing governmental interest. 2 7
Privacy supporters applauded the Court's decision in Riley as a step
in the right direction. 2 8 "[The Justices] get that digital technologies are
different from anything our culture has seen before.. . . and they get that,
in at least some contexts, the Old Rules need to change." 2 9 Riley is an
important case because it suggests that lower courts should consider the
unique issues surrounding cell phones, including the heightened privacy
concerns when applying the law. 30 Riley also provides a glimpse into how
the Court may analyze the issue of biometric recognition.
III. THE FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS

The request to compel the production of biometrics implicates the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. To begin, the Fourth Amendment is
explicitly implicated because the government is requesting authorization
to engage in this behavior through a warrant. The Fourth Amendment
provides:

'

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. 3
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the
general principles governing the use and obtainment of warrants. 32 In
regard to electronic devices, Rule 41 states that a warrant may authorize
the seizure of electronically stored media and information.3 3 As discussed
above, Riley requires that the government obtain a warrant prior to
searching the data on a cellphone. 34

26. Riley, 573 U.S. at 385 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
27. Id. at 401.
28. Richard M. Re, Symposium: Inaugurating the Digital Fourth Amendment, SCOTUS
BLOG (June 26, 2014, 12:37 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposiuminaugurating-the-digital-fourth-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/CHP5-6Q3Z].

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
33. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B).

34. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014).
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Moreover, the Fourth Amendment is implicated because of an
individual's right to privacy. Case law has established that the basic
purpose behind the Fourth Amendment "is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials." 35 Like the Court recognized in Riley, privacy concerns are at
an all-time high when cell phones are involved since an individual's
36
entire private life can be reconstructed through the stored information.
The Court reaffirmed the interest in safeguarding privacy rights of
individuals in Carpenterv. UnitedStates.3 7 There, the Court restated that
even in the face of advancing technology, "this Court has sought to
'assure preservation of that degree of privacy against government that
38
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.'
In Carpenter, the Court applied the Fourth Amendment "to a new
phenomenon: the ability to chronicle a erson's past movements through
the record of his cell phone signals."3 While the holding in Carpenter
was stressed to be a narrow one, the Court nevertheless recognized an
individual's reasonable privacy expectation "in the whole of their
physical movements" and found that the government did not acquire the
40
required warrant before seizing the defendant's cell-site records.
Despite the fact that there are various Fourth Amendment concerns
raised by these warrant requests, the courts that have addressed this issue
have dedicated little space to the Fourth Amendment analysis and focused
on the constitutionality of these requests under the Fifth Amendment.
While the courts' decisions seem to turn on whether or not the compelled
production of a physical characteristic is testimonial or nontestimonial
under the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment is likely to play a
much larger role in the outcome of this issue as it works its way up the
courts. This is supported by the Court's recent analyses in Carpenterand
Riley, where the Court stressed the heightened privacy concerns due to
the advancement of technology.
IV.

SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THE REQUEST TO
COMPEL BIOMETRICS

THE RIGHT AGAINST

The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part: "No person .. . shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... "4
It is well established that the right against self-incrimination is not
35. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct.
of City and Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
36. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 386.
37. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214.
38. Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
39. Id. at 2216.
40. Id. at 2217, 2220.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

20211
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absolute. 42 The privilege only applies to communications that are
testimonial, compelled, and incriminating. 43 It is a relatively simple task
to determine whether a communication is compelled or is incriminating,
but the line becomes blurry when deciding what constitutes a testimonial
versus a nontestimonial communication. To this end, the Court has stated
that "[t]he difficult question whether a compelled communication is
testimonial for purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment often depends
on the facts and circumstances of the particular case." 44
A testimonial communication is a communication that "explicitly or
implicitly, relate[s] a factual assertion or disclose[s] information." 45 The
Court has consistently held that the compulsion of certain acts falls
outside the protections of the Fifth Amendment despite the fact that the
compelled act may lead to incriminating information. 4 6 For example, in
Schmerber v. California,4 7 the Court held that the forced taking of a blood
sample did not violate the individual's right against self-incrimination. 4 8
The Court recognized that in compelling the blood sample the accused
was forced "to submit to an attempt to discover evidence that might be
used to prosecute him for a criminal offense," but this was not enough to
bring the compelled act within the meaning of the privilege. 4 9 "Not even
a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by
the accused was involved either in the extraction or in the chemical
analysis." 5 0 Similarly, the compulsion of voice exemplars, handwriting
exemplars, and fingerprints all fall outside the Fifth Amendment
privilege. 5' Through this line of cases, the Court generally established

42. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 (2000) ("The term 'privilege against selfincrimination' is not an entirely accurate description of a person's constitutional protection against
being 'compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.' The word 'witness' in the
constitutional text limits the relevant category of compelled incriminating communications to
those that are 'testimonial' in character.").

43. Id.
44. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 214-15 (1988) (citing Fisherv. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 410 (1976)).
45. Id at 210.
46. Id.
47. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
48. Id. at 772.
49. Id. at 761.
50. Id. at 765.
51. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973) (compelling voice exemplars does

not violate the Fifth Amendment); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1967) (compelling
handwriting exemplars does not violate the Fifth Amendment); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S.
245, 252-53 (1910) (compelling a suspect to put on particular clothing does not violate the Fifth
Amendment); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764 (compelling a suspect to submit to fingerprinting does
not violate the Fifth Amendment).
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that there is no testimonial communication in the "compelled display of
identifiable physical characteristics." 52
The compelled production of specific documents also raises Fifth
54
Amendment concerns. 5 3 In Fisher v. United States, the compelled
production of documents was held non-testimonial because the papers
55
were voluntarily prepared prior to the summons. Based on this, the
individual could not avoid complying with the summons on the grounds
56
that the documents contained incriminating information. However, in
United States v. Hubbell,57 the respondent was similarly subpoenaed to
produce specific documents, but the Court held this to be a testimonial
communication. 58 In analyzing the compelled act the Court stated:
We have held that "the act of production" itself may
implicitly communicate "statements of fact." By "producing
documents in compliance with a subpoena, the witness
would admit that the papers existed, were in his possession
or control, and were authentic." . . . Whether the
constitutional privilege protects . . . the act of production
itself, is a question that is distinct from the question whether
the unprotected contents of the documents themselves are
incriminating. 59
Here, the Court found that the respondent would "make extensive use
of 'the contents of his own mind"' in identifying and assembling the
compelled documents. 60 This made the production more analogous to
"telling an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe" rather than "being
6 1 Because the defendant
forced to surrender the key to a strongbox."
would implicitly communicate statements of fact through the production
of documents, the defendant was justified in refusing to comply with the
subpoena.
Biometrics are, by definition, physical characteristics. In warrant
requests to compel biometrics, law enforcement seeks to use these
physical traits to unlock a seized electronic device. Law enforcement
officials would likely argue that there is no Fifth Amendment issue when
they request authorization to compel the production of biometrics
52. See Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 5-7 (citing Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 266-67; Holt, 218 U.S. at
252).
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35-36.
425 U.S. 391 (1976).
Id. at 414.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36 (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409-10).
530 U.S. 27 (2000).
Id. at 43.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 43 (quoting Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957)).
Id. (citing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.9 (1988)).
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because there is nothing communicative in the act of production. "The
government chooses the finger to apply to the sensor, and thus obtains
the physical characteristic-all without need for the person to put any
thought at all into the seizure." 62 An individual could even be asleep or
unconscious during the seizure. 63 But, unlike the cases involving the
compulsion of a blood sample or voice exemplar, here the compulsion of
the physical trait is being used to unlock a cell phone, a device that stores
vast amounts of information. If the compelled physical characteristic
unlocks the seized cell phone, the individual implicitly communicates
that they had a least some control over the device and its contents.
V. THE SPLIT AMONG LOWER COURTS

"

The issue of compelling biometrics is beginning to arise in front of
judges more and more. So far, most of the litigation has taken place in the
lower district courts.
A. In re Applicationfor a Search Warrant
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois was one
of the first federal courts to issue an opinion on whether law enforcement
officials can compel biometrics. 65 In 2017, the magistrate judge was
presented with a warrant request where the government identified items
to be seized at a specified location and requested the authority to take the
electronics in order to conduct forensic analysis pursuant to Fed. R. Crim.
P. 41(e)(2)(B). 66 These standard requests raised no issues with the court.67
"[I]n its warrant application, the government also seeks the
authority to compel any individual who is present at the
subject premises at the time of the search to provide his
fingerprints and/or thumbprints onto the Touch ID sensor of
any Apple iPhone, iPad, or other Apple brand device in order
to gain access to the content of any such device." 68

62. In re Search Warrant Application for [Redacted Text], 279 F. Supp. 3d 800, 804 (N.D.

111. 2017).
63. Id.
64. But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670 F.3d 1335,

1352 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding the act of decrypting hard drives to be sufficiently testimonial so
the defendant was justified in refusing to comply with the subpoena duces tecum).
65. See In re Application for a Search Warrant, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1074 (N.D. III. 2017)
(concluding that the government had not "established a proper basis to force any individual at the
subject premises to provide a fingerprint").

66. Id at 1067.
67. Id
68. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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This abnormal request raised a number of concerns and was ultimately
denied. 69
First, the judge found that the warrant did not meet the probable cause
requirements of the Fourth Amendment to "compel any person who
happens to be at the subject premises at the time of the search to give his
fingerprint to unlock an unspecified Apple electronic device." 70 The
government argued that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated in the
taking of a fingerprint, but the court rejected this view.7 1 The judge
stressed that it is not the fingerprint itself but rather "the method of
obtaining the print that is at issue." 72 Here, the factual deficiencies of the
warrant such as the failure to specify the persons and specific devices
likely to be found at the premises violated the requirements of the Fourth

Amendment.7 3
Then, the judge turned to the Fifth Amendment concerns. 74 The Court
cited Hubbell and argued that a fingerprint is akin to a key that opens a
strongbox which involves no testimonial communication and therefore
falls outside Fifth Amendment protections. 75 The judge noted that
generally the production of physical characteristics does not raise Fifth
Amendment concerns, 76 but Fifth Amendment concerns are raised
"where the production of information is compelled, and the production
itself is deemed incriminating." 77
Applying previous Supreme Court decisions, the judge reasoned that
the compelled act does "explicitly or implicitly relate a factual assertion
or disclose information" because "[t]he connection between the
fingerprint and Apple's biometric security system, shows a connection
with the suspected contraband." 78
By using a finger to unlock a phone's contents, a suspect is
producing the contents on the phone. With a touch of a
finger, a suspect is testifying that he or she has accessed the
phone before, at a minimum, to set up the fingerprint
password capabilities, and that he or she currently has some
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1068.
71. In re Application for a Search Warrant, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 1068, 1069 (citing United
States v. Sechrist, 640 F.2d 81, 86 (7th Cir. 1981)).
72. Id. at 1070.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267, 270 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014)).
76. Id. at 1070-71 (citing United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 263, 267 (1966)).
77. In re Application for a Search Warrant, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 1071 (citing Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976)).
78. Id. at 1073 (citing United States v. Doe, 670 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2012)).
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level of control over or relatively significant connection to
the phone and its contents. 7 9
To the government's argument that the "Fifth Amendment
privilege ... offers no protection against compulsion to submit to
fingerprinting," the judge pointed out that the case law that the
government relies on was decided before the existence of cell phones and
only dealt with the use of fingerprinting for identification purposes. 80 The
judge then turned to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Riley for support
in rejecting the proposition that fingerprinting for identification purposes
and fingerprinting to unlock an electronic device are the same. 8 1 But, the
judge ended the opinion by stating that not all of these requests would
raise problems with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, leaving the door
open to future requests. 82
B. In the Matter of the Search WarrantApplication For
[Redacted Text]
Appearing to be one of the more active courts on this issue, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois addressed the legality
of compelling biometrics again a few months after In re Applicationfor
a Search Warrant.83 In the case of In the Matter of the Search Warrant
Application for [Redacted Text], 84 the court reviewed the order of a
magistrate judge who had similarly denied the request to compel the use
of fmgerprints. 8 5 Reviewing the decision as a matter of first impression,
the district court disagreed that "the Fifth Amendment prohibits the
forced unlocking of a device by finger touch." 86 The district court instead
held that the Fifth Amendment did not bar a warrant requesting
authorization to compel home residents to produce their fingerprints to
unlock electronic devices. 87
In this case, the government requested "authorization to seize, in
effect, the four residents in order to apply their fingers (including thumbs)
79. Id
80. Id (criticizing the government's reliance on United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223

(1967)).
81. Id at 1073-74 (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014)).
82. Id at 1074.
83. See In re Search Warrant Application for [Redacted Text], 279 F. Supp. 3d 800, 801

(N.D. II1. 2017).
84. 279 F. Supp. 3d 800 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
85. Id.
86. In re Search of Single-Family Home & Attached Garage Located at [redacted], 2017

WL 4563870, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2017), rev'd, 279 F. Supp. 3d 800.
87. In re Search Warrant Application for [Redacted Text], 279 F. Supp. 3d at 807 ("For the
reasons discussed, the government's application to require the fingerprint seizure of the four
residents does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination set forth in the Fifth
Amendment.").
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to Apple-made devices (here, most likely iPhones and iPads) found at the
home." 88 The affidavit in support of the warrant application stated that
89
the devices were likely encrypted, requiring a passcode or Touch ID.
The government stressed that the ability to unlock a device with Touch
ID is time sensitive, "[s]o to take advantage of this potential way of
unlocking an iPhone or iPad, the government asks that the four residents
of the home-if they are present during the search-be required to press
fingers, chosen by the [G]overnment, to the [t]ouch ID sensor. "90
The magistrate judge denied the warrant because such a compelled
production would violate an individual's Fifth Amendment privilege, but
the district court reversed in part, finding that the warrant did not violate
an individual's right against self-incrimination. 9 1 The district court stated
that the fingerprint seizure sought in the warrant application did not
engage the thought process of any of the individuals. 2 "The application
of the fingerprint to the sensor is simply the seizure of a physical
characteristic, and the fingerprint by itself does not communicate
anything." 93 The district court distinguished this act from the line of cases
that involve the production of documents by relying on the fact that the
94
compelled individual did not have to put any thought into the seizure.
In addition, the district court rejected the magistrate judge's
characterization of "the fingerprint seizure as containing an implicit
communication when the fingerprint is applied to the Touch ID sensor:
if the device unlocks, then the incriminating inference is that the person
had possession or control of the device." 95 The court said the fact that the
compelled physical trait yields incriminating information does not
immediately make the compulsion unconstitutional. 96 "If a compelled act
is not testimonial, then the privilege against self-incrimination does not
apply-even if the act is incriminating." 9 7 So, if the act does not
inherently contain a communication then the compulsion is
constitutional.
The court found the surrender of a person's fingerprint to be analogous
to the surrender of a key to a safe whose contents are otherwise
unavailable. 9 8 Based on this reasoning, the warrant application did not

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 802.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 801.
Id. at 804.

93. In re Search Warrant Application for [Redacted Text], 279 F. Supp. 3d at 807

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

In re Search Warrant Application for [Redacted Text], 279 F. Supp. 3d at 804.
Id. at 805 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. (citing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988)).
Id. at 806.
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violate an individual's Fifth Amendment right. 99 However, the court did
limit its holding by suggesting that there are times when the Fourth
Amendment would preclude the authorization of these requests. 100
In re Applicationfor a Search Warrantand In the Matter of the Search
Warrant Application for [Redacted] involved similar warrant requests
and were decided in the same court within the same year. The fact that
the two turned out differently is counter-intuitive and highlights the split
among courts. One way to distinguish the two cases might be in the
specificity of the warrant requests. In the warrant at issue in In re
Application for a Search Warrant the government requested
authorization to compel "any individual who is present" 10' while the
request of In the Matter of the Search Warrant Application for
[Redacted] narrowly tailored its request to four individuals. 0 2 It makes
sense that law enforcement sought to make their request more specific
after the magistrate judge highlighted the factual deficiencies of the
warrant request.
.

C. In the Matter of Search of [Redacted] Washington, District of
Columbia

In 2018, a magistrate judge for the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia addressed this "emerging area of the law" in the case of In
the Matter of the Search of [Redacted] Washington, District of
Columbia.103 Similar to the two preceding cases discussed above, the
warrant application requested the following:
"[D]uring the execution of the search of the [premises]
described in Attachment A, law enforcement personnel are
also specifically authorized to compel [the Subject] to
provide biometric features, including pressing his fingers
(including thumbs) against and/or putting his face before the
sensor, or any other security feature requiring biometric
recognition, of:
(a) any of the [Subject Devices] found at the [premises], and
(b) where the [Subject Devices] are limited to those which
are capable of containing and reasonably could contain
fruits,
evidence,
information,
contraband,
or
instrumentalities of the offense(s) as described in the search
warrant affidavit and warrant attachments,

99. Id. at 807.
In re Search Warrant Application for [Redacted Text], 279 F. Supp. 3d at 807.

100.

101. See In re Application for a Search Warrant, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1067 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
102. In re Search Warrant Application for [Redacted Text], 279 F. Supp. 3d at 807.

103. In re Search of [Redacted] Wash., D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d 523, 526 (D.D.C. 2018).

UNIVERSITYOF FLORIDA JOURNAL OFLAW & PUBLIC POLICY

320

[Vol. 31

for the purpose of attempting to unlock the [Subject
Devices'] security features in order to search the contents as
authorized by this warrant."104
The warrant request included a disclaimer that law enforcement
officials would not force the Subject to provide his passcode nor would
they force him to identify which fingerprint was used in accessing the
device.1 05
The judge granted the warrant application, finding that it did not
conflict with Fourth or Fifth Amendment guarantees.1 06 Beginning with
an analysis of whether compelling biometrics violated an individual's
Fourth Amendment rights, the court relied on the fact that it has been
consistently held that obtaining physical characteristics from an
individual does not amount to an intrusion upon a person's privacy under
the Fourth Amendment. 107 The court noted that when a physical
characteristic is used for investigatory purposes, different Fourth
Amendment concerns are raised.1 08
When physical characteristics are used for investigatory purposes,
[t]he question then is-even where the government is
permitted to detain briefly an individual during a search
warrant's execution . . . what further showing does the
Fourth Amendment require before the government may be
authorized to compel the use of an individual's biometric
features in an attempt to unlock a digital device ... ?109
The court then formulated a standard that the government must meet
when attempting to unlock an electronic device for investigatory
purposes:
[T]he government may compel the use of an individual's
biometric features, if (1) the procedure is carried out with
dispatch and in the immediate vicinity of the premises to be
searched, and if, at time of the compulsion, the government
has (2) reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed
a criminal act that is the subject matter of the warrant, and
(3) reasonable suspicion that the individual's biometric
features will unlock the device, that is, for example, because

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 526-27.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 530.
In re Search of [Redacted] Wash., D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d at 530.

TH LEGALFIY OF COMP'ELLING BIOMETRICS

20211l

321

there is a reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual
is a user of the device. 10
Turning to the Fifth Amendment analysis, the court found the
guarantee against self-incrimination protects an individual "from having
to reveal, directly or indirectly, knowledge of facts relating him to the
offense or from having to share his thoughts and beliefs with the
Government." 1 " The federal public defender argued that compelling
biometrics "is inherently testimonial because it would implicitly
communicate that the suspect possessed or controlled the device with
incriminating evidence." 1 2 The court rejected this argument, finding that
the compelled production of biometrics is "far more akin to the surrender
of a safe's key than its combination," referring to the infamous Hubbell

distinction.

13

The compulsion of the individual's biometric features was found to
be more analogous to compelling a safe's key, which is unprotected,
because "there will be no revelation of the contents of the Subject's mind
with the procedure proposed by the government for collection of the
Subject's biometric features."" 4 In this case, "[t]he government chooses
the finger to apply to the sensor, and thus obtains the physical
characteristic-all without the need for the person to put any thought at
all into the seizure." 1 5 The court found this case to be analogous to
drawing blood to test the blood-alcohol level or- requiring a suspect to
put on a specific shirt for identification purposes and concluded that the
compelled production of biometrics was non-testimonial."1 6 "[T]he Fifth
Amendment privilege is not triggered where, as here, 'the [g]overnment
merely compels some physical act, i.e., where the individual is not called
upon to make use of the contents of his mind.""'
D. In the Matter of the Search of a Residence in Oakland, California
More recently, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California faced this issue.1 18 Here, the magistrate judge denied the
warrant request finding that it ran afoul of Fourth and Fifth Amendment
110. Id. at 532-33.
111. Id. at 534 (citing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988)).
112. Id at 535 (internal quotation marks omitted).

113. Id (referring to United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000)).
114. Id. at 535-36.
115. In re Search of [Redacted] Wash., D.C., 317 F. Supp. 3d at 536 (quoting In re Search
Warrant Application for [Redacted Text], 279 F. Supp. 3d at 804).

116. Id. at 536-37 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764-65 (1966)).
117. Id. at 537 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 25, 2011, 670

F.3d 1335, 1345 (11th Cir. 2012)).
118. In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, Cal., 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1013-14 (N.D. Cal.

2019).

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF IA W& PUBLIC POLICY

322

[Vol. 31

guarantees. 119 In In the Matter of the Search of a Residence in Oakland,
California,the government submitted an application for a search warrant
that paralleled the warrant applications seen in the previously explained
cases. 120 The Government's application requested the authority to seize
various items at an identified location and "to compel any individual
present at the time of the search to press a finger (including a thumb) or
utilize other biometric features, such as facial or iris recognition, for the
purposes of unlocking the digital devices found in order to permit a search
12 1 It should be noted
of the contents as authorized by the search warrant."
that the government requested authorization to compel any individual in
its request here. 122
Similar to the previously discussed opinions, the court began its
analysis with whether the warrant infringed upon Fourth Amendment
guarantees.1 2 3 The court focused on the broad language of the warrant
request and easily found that it violated the Fourth Amendment as it
lacked sufficient probable cause to compel any individual to produce
4
biometrics and to seize all digital devices. 12 The court also left the door
open for the government to resubmit the warrant application, suggesting
that the warrant would comply with Fourth Amendment requirements if
it were specifically tailored. 25
Then the court turned to the Fifth Amendment.1 2 6 The court focused
on the purpose of the fingerprints, and it noted that fingerprints serve the
27
same purpose as a passcode-they are used to unlock a device.1 So, the
seemingly non-testimonial physical characteristic is made testimonial
because of the way the characteristic is being used. 12 8 For this reason, the
court held that the biometrics could not be compelled by the
government.1 29 If the feature unlocks the device, "the act concedes that
the phone was in the possession and control of the suspect, [sic] and
authenticates ownership or access to the phone and all of its digital
contents."'30
Due to the implicit communication, the court found that using a
fingerprint or facial scan to unlock a phone was fundamentally different
from drawing blood or identifying a person from a voice exemplar.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 1013.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1013-14.
See In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, Cal., 354 F. Supp. 3d. at 1014.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 1015.
Id. at 1016.
Id.
In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, Cal., 354 F. Supp. 3d. at 1016.
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"'[W]ith a touch of a finger, a suspect is testifying that he or she has
accessed the phone before, at a minimum, to set up the fingerprint
password capabilities, and that he or she currently has some level of
control over or relatively significant connection to the phone and its
contents.'"" 3 ' The court stressed that the foregone conclusion doctrine
would not be able to save these types of requests from invalidation
because law enforcement could not anticipate the full contents of a
mobile device.' 3 2 "[T]he Government inherently lacks the requisite prior
knowledge of the information and documents that could be obtained via
a search of these unknown digital devices, such that it would not be a
question of mere surrender," so the foregone conclusion doctrine would
not apply.1 33
VI. THIS ISSUE IN THE NEWS

The issue of compelling biometrics has started to receive more
attention from the courts and the public. For example, this issue was
recently seen in the news after the warrant applications for Michael
Cohen's devices were released. On March 20, 2019, CNN reported that
the "FBI made use of Cohen's use of Touch ID and Face ID on his Apple
devices." 13 4 "[A]n FBI agent requested authorization 'to press the fingers
(including thumbs) of Cohen to the Touch ID sensors of the Subject
Devices, or hold the Subject Devices in front of Cohen's face, for the
purpose of attempting to unlock the Subject Devices via Touch ID or Face
ID."" 5 The article pointed out that Touch ID and Face ID are marketed
as being more secure, when in fact, each really gives law enforcement
another way to access the contents of private devices.1 36 CNBC also
picked up this story and highlighted that Apple has traditionally fought
against law enforcement's efforts to access devices, but here law
enforcement has found a way around Apple. 137 CNBC reported that
previous court rulings have varied on whether or not individuals can
131. Id. (quoting In re Application for a Search Warrant, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1073 (N.D.

QIl. 2017)).
132. Id. at 1017 (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 399 (2014)).
133. In re Search of a Residence in Oakland, Cal., 354 F. Supp. 3d at 1017-18 (citing United
States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 44-45 (2000)).
134. Kevin Collier & Marshall Cohen, Michael Cohen warrants show how the FBI can
unlock your phone and track your movements, CNN POLITICs, https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/

19/politics/michael-cohen-warrants-fbi-phone/index.html

[https://perma.cc/LX4Y-E77Q] (Mar.

20, 2019, 2:56 PM).
135. Id. (citing warrant application).

136. Id.
137. Lauren Feiner, Investigators sought to use Michael Cohen's face andfingerprints to
access his Apple devices, CNBC (Mar. 19, 2019, 12:12 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/
19/investigators-asked-to-use-michael-cohens-face-id-to-access-iphone.html
[https://perma.cc/

T4VC-TC33].
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legally be compelled to produce biometric data so that law enforcement
officials can gain access to their electronic devices.1 38
VII. IS THE SOLUTION TO REQUIRE A PASSCODE?
A passcode is made up of a sequence of letters, numbers, and other
characters. A passcode can be required prior to accessing an electronic
device. Just like biometric recognition in cell phones, passcodes are a way
to protect a device from unwanted intrusion. Although biometrics and
passcodes serve the same purpose, passcodes are treated differently under
the law. Courts have afforded more protections to passcodes finding that
passcodes, as opposed to biometrics, are protected under the Fifth
Amendment as testimonial communications.! 9
While there are some exceptions, most courts have ruled that an
individual cannot be forced to reveal their passcode, as this requires an
individual to reveal the inner contents of their mind.1 4 0 In the 2014
decision of Commonwealth of Virginia v. Baust,141 the state court held
that the defendant's passcode could not be compelled because of the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.' In the same breath, the
43
court held that the defendant could be forced to produce his fmgerprint.1
The court reasoned that compelling a passcode required the defendant to
reveal his mental processes, which is testimonial, but compelling
fmgerprints would not require the defendant to communicate anything so
it did not qualify as a protected communication under the Fifth
Amendment. 44 Despite the fact that passcodes and fmgerprints are being
used for the same purpose here, courts have tended to distinguish the two.
In light of this, requiring a passcode appears to be the most secure method
of protecting electronic devices.
CONCLUSION

The question of whether law enforcement can compel an individual to
produce fingerprints and other biometrics for the purpose of unlocking a
lawfully seized electronic is an important one due to the pervasive
presence of cellphones and the amount of data contained within a device.
138. Id.
139. See Pratik Parikh, IPHONEX: Unlocking the Self IncriminationClause of the Fifth

Amendment, 45 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 58, 78 (2019) (citing United States v.
Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 668 (E.D. Mich. 2010)).
140. Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267, 270 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014) (citing United States
v. Doe, 487 U.S. 201, 211 (1988)); but see State v. Stahl, 206 So. 3d 124, 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2016) (holding that requiring the defendant to produce his passcode was not testimonial).
141. 89 Va. Cir. 267 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014).
142. Id. at 271.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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Currently, there is a split among lower courts on whether the request to
compel biometrics infringes upon constitutional rights. The major focus
in these cases appear to be whether the compelled production of
biometrics is a protected testimonial communication or an unprotected
non-testimonial communication within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment.
On one hand, there is an argument that this is a non-testimonial
communication because the participation of the individual is irrelevant.
In a sense, the act is like the production of a key to the safe. The individual
hands over the key and while it may lead to incriminating information, it
does not require the revelation of any mental processes.
On the other hand, the alleged non-testimonial act is being used for
the purpose of unlocking a cell phone. If the physical trait successfully
unlocks the device, then the individual is conveying an implicit
communication that they had at least some control over the device.
Additionally, the physical characteristic serves the same purpose as a
passcode, which is generally afforded more protection.
In light of the heightened privacy concerns implicated by cell phones
and the Court's decision in Riley, the Fourth Amendment may also bar
the very broad and generalized requests to compel biometrics. When
weighing an individual's privacy interests with law enforcement's
interests, it appears that the privacy interests significantly outweigh the
competing interests as an individual's entire private life can be
reconstructed through the data stored on their cell phone.
However, this is not to say that law enforcement should be precluded
from compelling biometrics completely. The ability to access the contents
of a device serves important investigatory purposes. The government
should be able to utilize these requests to gain access to cell phones,
especially since cell phones are not precluded from being searched. In
Riley, the Court held that a cell phone could be searched if law
enforcement secured a warrant.
At a minimum, law enforcement officials should be required to plead
with particularity who can be compelled to produce biometrics and what
devices are likely to be involved. This would make any warrant
application requesting authorization to compel "any" individual to
produce biometrics facially invalid. Additionally, law enforcement
should also need to specify the contents of the phone they plan to search
to limit the intrusion on an individual's privacy. Whether that entails
specifying applications included in the search or pinpointing the
particular communications, there must be some limit to the search.
Ultimately, to have clarity on this issue, the Supreme Court will have
to weigh in on the constitutionality of compelling biometrics. The
widespread use of cell phones coupled with the lack of uniformity among
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the lower courts suggests that this issue will be one the Court will address
sooner rather than later.

